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BATTLING GENDER ORTHODOXY:
PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS
OF GENDER IDENTITY AND EXPRESSION IN
THE COURTS AND IN THE LEGISLATURES
Carolyn E. Coffey*
INTRODUCTION
After years of discrimination and suffering in the most diverse
city in the world, an often overlooked group of people achieved a
victory in 2002, when the New York City Council amended the
City’s human rights law to define the protected class of “gender” to
include transgendered people. Finally, this made it clear that dis-
crimination against transgendered people would not be tolerated.1
Considering the absence of legal recourse at the state and national
levels, local ordinances like New York City’s amended law currently
provide transgendered people with their only protection against
discrimination.
This Article focuses on case law and legislation regarding the
rights of transgendered people in the workplace and in the public
arena. The Article examines the different legal strategies and out-
comes of various cases brought by transgender plaintiffs in court-
rooms. It also examines attempts to use the legislative process to
advance transgendered people’s rights, and discusses different the-
oretical perspectives that have emerged in the transgender battle.
Part I provides an overview of the subject of transgenderism; Part II
broadly examines the discrimination that transgendered individu-
als face daily; Part III describes federal gender and transgender dis-
crimination case law; Part IV discusses state transgender
discrimination case law; Part V describes local ordinances that exist
across the country to protect transgendered people; and Part VI
examines the significance of New York City’s amendment to its def-
inition of gender. The Article concludes that a combination of
strategies will ultimately best serve the transgender movement in
* J.D., City University of New York School of Law, 2004; B.A., Franklin & Marshall
College, 1994.  The author thanks the New York City Law Review editorial board,
staff, adviser Andrea McArdle, mentor Ruthann Robson, and Brian J. Venerus for
their assistance and support.  Winner of 2003 CLAGS Graduate Student Paper Award
Competition.
1 NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102 (2002).
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the battle to overcome one of the last bastions of civil rights
discrimination.
I. WHAT IS “TRANSGENDERISM”?
“Unless you have actually experienced transsexualism, you cannot
conceive of the trauma of being cast in the wrong body. It is the imprison-
ment of body and of soul.”2
The terms “gender” and “sex” often are used interchangeably,
however, they have different definitions and connotations. Gener-
ally, the term “sex” is used in reference to a person’s biological
identity, while “gender” usually refers to culturally ascribed or so-
cially constructed characteristics of masculinity and femininity.3
Such characteristics vary with different societies and cultures, but a
transgendered person is considered someone who possesses tradi-
tional gender characteristics that are different from his or her sex.4
Although individuals are assigned a sex at birth, some males grow
up feeling they were meant to be females and some females grow
up feeling they were meant to be males. A transgendered person’s
desire to be the opposite sex may become powerful at an early
age.5
The American Psychiatric Association considers transgender-
ism a medical condition, and classifies it as a specific form of a
2 Patricia A. Cain, Stories from the Gender Garden: Transsexuals and Anti-Discrimina-
tion Law, 75 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1321, 1343 (1998) (quoting MARIO MARTINO WITH HARRI-
ETT, EMERGENCE: A TRANSSEXUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1977)).
3 Jamison Green, Introduction to PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, NAT’L CTR.
FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICY-
MAKERS 2 (2000) [hereinafter Introduction to TRANSGENDER EQUALITY]; see also Jillian
Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Privacy, and Heteronormativity, 10 LAW &
SEXUALITY 123, 124 n.3 (quoting MILDRED L. BROWN & CHLOE ANNE ROUNSLEY, TRUE
SELVES 19 (1996)).
4 See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Confla-
tion of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 39, 66 (1995) (arguing generally that traditionally, men are supposed to be
strong, assertive, virile, macho and rational, whereas women are supposed to be weak,
passive, quiescent and emotional). One source estimates that approximately one to
four percent of the world’s population is intersexed, that is, born with ambiguous
genitalia.  Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision
between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 267 (1999).  However, because inter-
sexed people are characterized by ambiguous genitalia, “intersexed” and “trans-
gendered” are not interchangeable terms. Introduction to TRANSGENDER EQUALITY,
supra note 3, at 5.
5 See Jill Pilgrim, David Martin & Will Binder, Far from the Finish Line: Transsexual-
ism and Athletic Competition, 13 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 495 (2003)
(discussing the debate over whether gender identity problems are psychiatric or bio-
logical in origin).
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broader psychiatric disorder called “gender identity disorder.”6 A
diagnosis is confirmed when gender dysphoria has been present
for at least two years and the feelings of having the wrong identity
are alleviated by cross-gender identification.7 According to one
medical source:
Transsexualism is a Gender Identity Disorder in which there is a
strong and on-going cross-gender identification, i.e., a desire to
live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex. There is a
persistent discomfort with his or her anatomical sex and a sense
of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex.8
The currently accepted and effective treatment for the syn-
drome is hormone therapy and surgical reconstruction, along with
counseling and other psychotherapeutic treatments, such as elec-
trolysis and speech therapy.9 Transgendered people who have un-
dergone such treatments to change their gender are referred to as
post-operative transsexuals, whereas those who have not completed
the transition sometimes are referred to as pre-operative transsexu-
als, and those who have chosen to not take such measures may be
referred to as non-operative transsexuals.10 One estimate puts the
number of pre-operative and non-operative transgendered people
at approximately one out of 1,600 people, or, in the United States,
nearly 225,000 people.11
6 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS IV 533 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL].
7 Id.
8 R. Reid et al., Transsexualism: The Current Medical Viewpoint, Press for Change
(1996), at http://www.pfc.org.uk/medical/mediview.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2003)
(on file with the New York City Law Review). See also PsychNet-UK, Disorder Information
Sheet: Gender Identity Disorder (Jul. 20, 2003), at www.psychnet-uk.com/dsm_iv/gen-
der_identity_disorder.htm (describing the diagnostic criteria for gender identity dis-
order as being “a strong persistent cross-gender identification (not merely a desire for
any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex)”); AllPsych Online, Psychiat-
ric Disorders: Gender Identity Disorder (May 15, 2004), at http://allpsych.com/disorders/
sexual/genderidentity.html (stating that symptoms include “a strong and persistent
identification with the opposite gender.  There is a sense of discomfort in their own
gender and may feel they were ‘born the wrong sex’”).
9 Reid et al., supra note 8.
10 KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN AND THE REST OF US 67
(1994). See also Introduction to TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 3, at 3.
11 Kristine W. Holt, Comment, Reevaluating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection, and
the Evolution of a Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 Temple L. Rev. 283, 301 (1997) (quoting
Marla Aspen, De-Medicalization of Transsexualism and De-Classification of Sex, 65 Tapestry
J. 11, 11, 20 (1993)).  However, precise figures are difficult to calculate. See, e.g., The
National Transgender Advocacy Coalition, TG Numbers: Occurrence Within U.S. Popula-
tion and Others (June 4, 2003), at www.ntac.org/research/details.asp?did=37 (listing
results from several studies of transgender behavior, but admitting that such figures
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The term “gender identity” refers to the gender that people
psychologically embrace–be it male, female or something in be-
tween.12 “Gender expression” refers to the gender that people ap-
pear to be based on external male or female characteristics,
including dress, speech, and mannerisms.13 This Article uses the
umbrella term “transgender” to refer to anyone whose gender
identity or expression differs from conventional or stereotypical ex-
pectations of sex, including all pre-operative, post-operative and
non-operative transgendered people. Other terms that similarly ap-
ply include “gender variant,” “gender different,” and “gender non-
conforming.”14
The jurisprudence of transgenderism is not yet settled, and is
fairly controversial as evidenced by the range of theoretical com-
mentary and conflicting beliefs about why and to what extent trans-
gender discrimination exists. As more transgendered people assert
their rights, there will be an increase in the need to address trans-
gendered people’s unique legal problems and the discrimination
they face in pursuit of equality.
II. TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION
Although the media and movie industries occasionally have
portrayed transgendered people sympathetically and positively,
phobia of transgendered people is prevalent.15 Transgendered in-
dividuals face many forms of discrimination in all areas of life. One
individual described the stigma associated with being
transgendered:
When I was growing up, people who lived cross-gendered lives
were pressured into hiding deep within the darkest closets they
could find. Those who came out of their closets were either
studied under a microscope, ridiculed in the tabloids, or made
exotic in porn books, so it paid to hide. It paid to lie.16
Little legal recourse is available to combat gender identity dis-
may be imprecise for various reasons, due to “closeted sample set, bias in early studies,
poor definitions of the community, and a very small number of accurate studies”).
12 Introduction to TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 3, at 3.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 4.
15 See Patti Hartigan, Crossing Over, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2001, at N1. But see
Jillian Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Privacy, and Heteronormativity, 10
LAW & SEX. 123, 184 (2001) (“This heteronormativity requires that transsexual people
be seen as outside the system, as freaks, not even human.”); Greenberg, supra note 4,
at 324 (“Transgendered individuals are not out of the closet because they know that
society still considers them to be ‘freaks.’”).
16 BORNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 8.
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crimination, because traditional jurisprudence requires that indi-
viduals be classified into discrete and binary categories, even when
some people do not fit easily into one category.17 U.S. jurispru-
dence has no mechanism for dealing with transgender issues be-
cause the courts work “within a paradigm positing a rigid view of
mutually exclusive sexes” and are “incapable of coping with the
medical proposition that sex operates along a continuum.”18
Transgendered individuals face problems in any area that re-
quires an overt classification of male or female, including athletics,
job applications, housing, and restrooms. Often transgendered
people must “explain” their sex designation, which can be embar-
rassing. Other times they are simply refused service.19
Discrimination begins early for some transgendered people.
For example, in a Massachusetts public school, a fifteen-year old
transgendered student who identified as female was medically diag-
nosed as gender dysphoric.20 Nonetheless, the school prohibited
her from dressing in girls’ clothing or wearing accessories, and re-
peatedly refused to allow her to attend classes unless she went
home and changed.21 The student eventually stopped attending
school because she was so traumatized by the treatment she
received.22
Transgendered people also face discrimination in the work-
place. Such discrimination includes harassment in the form of of-
fensive or intimidating behavior by co-workers or supervisors, not
addressing a person by her or his chosen name or pronoun, refus-
ing to allow a person to use the appropriate bathroom, and asking
offensive questions about a person’s medical history or genitalia.23
Numerous transgendered people have been fired from their jobs
because of their gender status. Ramona Holloway was fired from
Arthur Anderson because she transitioned from a male to a female
17 See Greenberg, supra note 4, at 324.
18 Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the “Nascent Jurisprudence of
Transsexualism,” 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 333 (1993).
19 For example, Lucas Rosa, a biological man who lives as a woman, attempted to
obtain a loan application at a bank and was refused by an employee who angrily told
her to go home and change into more traditionally masculine clothes. Rosa v. Park
West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
20 Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060-A, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 491 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
11, 2000).
21 Id. at *2-3.
22 Id. at *5.
23 See NCLR, Gender Identity Discrimination and Employment Law: Your Rights Under
California Law at http://www.nclrights.org/publications/genderlaw.htm (last visited
Aug. 11, 2004) (on file with the New York City Law Review).
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while working for the company;24 Karen Ulane was fired from her
job as an airline pilot at Eastern Airlines for changing her sex from
male to female;25 and Audra Sommers, who was hired at Budget
Marketing as a woman, was fired from her job after it was discov-
ered she had been born a man.26
F. M. Chester, a transgender and lesbian activist whose gender
presentation is masculine, described growing up correcting people
who thought she was a boy.27 She recounted how she was teased in
school and frequently chased out of women’s restrooms.28 She
pointed out that much discrimination against gay, lesbian and bi-
sexual people occurs not necessarily because of their sexual orien-
tation, but because they present themselves as gender deviant.29
Discrimination in the form of crime targeted at transgendered
individuals is prevalent. Sixty percent of transgendered people
have been victims of hate violence and some have even been killed
because of their transgender identity.30 At a symposium on atti-
tudes toward homosexuals and transgendered people in New York
City, participants recounted discrimination by New York City police
officers against gay and transgendered people.31 In particular, one
speaker told of a transgendered woman who, while taking a ciga-
rette break, exchanged pleasantries with someone and was then ar-
rested for solicitation and subsequently jailed.32 Later she
discovered that the local police precinct in the West Village of New
York City was instructed to conduct regular transgender-focused
“morals sweep[s].”33
A. Discrimination in the Courts
As discussed in later sections, transgendered people who file
24 Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
25 Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1017 (1985).
26 Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
27 PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, TRANS-
GENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 30 (n.d.) (in a lob-
bying session in support of a gender-identity fairness ordinance) [hereinafter
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY].
28 Id. at 31.
29 Id.
30 Sean Cahill, Preface to PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, NAT’L CTR. FOR LES-
BIAN RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS i,
iii (n.d.).
31 Symposium Proceedings: Does New York City Look Different to You? The Changing
Legal Landscape of Queer New York City, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 139 (2000-01).
32 Id. at 145.
33 Id. at 146.
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discrimination suits usually do not succeed, presumably because
there are few laws and legal theories upon which to base a solid
claim. Courts commonly do not interpret laws that prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sex and/or sexual orientation and laws
that prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities to ap-
ply to transgendered people.34 The motivation behind excluding
transgendered people from civil rights protection is not immedi-
ately apparent. According to transgender activists Paisley Currah
and Shannon Minter, the exclusion is not due to failures in legal
reasoning, but because transgendered people “have not been
viewed as worthy of protection, or in some cases, even as human.”35
Revulsion seems to lie at the root of most transgender discrim-
ination. Many court opinions openly deride transgendered plain-
tiffs and express disapproval of or discomfort with their decision to
change their gender.36 Theorist Richard F. Storrow has written
about courts’ overarching hostility toward transgendered people.
He has specifically examined the numerous inconsistent ap-
proaches of various courts when deciding cases involving trans-
gendered people.37 He observes that courts are threatened by the
idea of a person willfully altering her or his body because it dis-
rupts the fixed social order.38 Storrow points out that laws are con-
structed to only accept traditional binary categories of male and
female sex: “The law is unprepared to encompass the blurring of
these categories in the phenomenon of transsexualism and reacts
to maintain them.”39 However, Storrow discovered that where hard
medical evidence points to a diagnosis of “gender dysphoria,”
courts are more likely to decide in favor of transgendered people.40
He has theorized that surgery to align one’s psychological and
physical sexes may be acceptable in light of courts’ tendency to
favor congruence.41
34 See discussion infra in this Part.
35 Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve
Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgendered People, 7 Wm. & Mary J. of Women & L.
37, 39-40 (2000).
36 As just two examples, see Ulane v. East. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087  (7th
Cir. 1984), where the court said, “[b]ut even if one believes that a woman can be so
easily created from what remains of a man, that does not decide this case.”; and Som-
mers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982), where the court said,
“[i]rrespective of the plaintiff’s manipulation of semantics, the Court finds no genu-
ine issue of fact as to plaintiff’s sex at the time of discharge from employment.”
37 Storrow, supra note 18.
38 Id. at 279.
39 Id. at 278-9.
40 Id. at 283-4.
41 Id. at 284.
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The fear of non-binary categories may also be described as
“classification anxiety,” which is related to society’s need to identify
with definitive categories.42 “It is reinforced by ‘the need for a rec-
ognizable identity, and the need to belong to a group of people
with a similar identity–these are driving forces in our culture, and
nowhere is this more evident than in the areas of gender and sexu-
ality.’”43 It is clear that the concept of gender is controversial, and
the bases for such controversy may explain why so few transgender
discrimination cases have succeeded in the courts.
B. Discrimination in Legislative Pursuits
In their attempt to obtain rights, transgendered people have
faced animosity not just in the courts, but also in their attempts to
gain equality legislatively. According to the National Gay and Les-
bian Task Force, only fourteen percent of the U.S. population live
in jurisdictions with transgender-inclusive anti-discrimination
laws.44 To date, only seventy-three jurisdictions in the United
States, including cities, counties, and states, have passed human
rights laws protecting transgendered people.45
One reason for the slow progress on transgender rights is that
the transgender movement is often combined with or subsumed
under the gay and lesbian equality movement, thereby generating
controversy.46 Transgendered people have faced blatant discrimi-
nation from the homosexual community.47 Some opponents of the
inclusion of transgendered people in the gay and lesbian move-
ment accuse transgendered people of being homophobic gays who
wish to change their sex in order to be “normal.”48 Other gay and
lesbian advocates, in jurisdictions that lack nondiscrimination laws
for sexual orientation, fear the inclusion of transgender issues in
their appeal for equality, as it may undermine their efforts.49 They
42 Leslie Pearlman, Transsexualism as Metaphor: The Collision of Sex and Gender, 43
BUFF. L. REV. 835, 844 (1995).
43 Id. at n.34 (quoting KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW ON MEN, WOMEN AND THE
REST OF US 3-4 (1994)).
44 Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Populations of Jurisdictions with Explicitly Trans-
gender-Inclusive Anti-Discrimination Laws (June 2003), at www.thetaskforce.org/
downloads/transinclusivelaws.pdf (on file with the New York City Law Review).
45 Transgender Law & Policy Institute, U.S. Jurisdictions with Laws Prohibiting Dis-
crimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Expression (Sept. 15, 2004), at
www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/ngltftlpichart.pdf (on file with the New York City
Law Review) [hereinafter U.S. Jurisdictions with Laws Prohibiting Discrimination].
46 See Introduction to TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 3, at 6-7.
47 See id. at 7.
48 Id.
49 Evidence of this discord was especially prevalent during the period of time lead-
2004] BATTLING GENDER ORTHODOXY 169
argue that while society may be slowly acclimating to the idea of
granting rights to homosexuals, society is not yet ready to accept
transgendered people, and thus drawing attention to this separate
group may impede the gay and lesbian movement.50 Lesbian and
gay interest groups have outright stated that if a legislature agrees
to treat sexual orientation as a suspect class at the cost of not in-
cluding transgendered people, they will not give up the opportu-
nity to push for the enactment of such a statute. They add,
somewhat conciliatorily, that further protections can always be ob-
tained later.51
In contrast, many transgender advocates argue that the trans-
gender and sexual orientation groups have faced similar oppres-
sion in the past and share the goal of eradicating sexism and
gender stereotyping.52 They argue that prohibiting discrimination
based on gender affects gays, lesbians, and those heterosexuals
who are perceived as not being “masculine” or “feminine”
enough.53 These individuals are discriminated against not for their
sexual orientation, but for not conforming to gender norms.54
Some gay and lesbian activists agree with this stance, and adopt an
inclusive approach.55 Regardless of differences between the gay
and transgendered movements, there are inarguable common is-
sues, such as gender non-conformity which may be pursued in the
legislatures.56
ing up to the passage of the New York State Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination
Act (SONDA), which went into effect in 2003. SONDA outlaws discrimination against
gays and lesbians in New York State, but the language of the bill does not protect
transgendered people, which caused many transgendered people to feel abandoned
by the gay community.  See, e.g., Richard Goldstein, Life After SONDA, VILLAGE VOICE,
Dec. 31, 2002, at 45 (stating that transgendered people were purposely not included
in the language of SONDA because the Empire State Pride Agenda (ESPA) “feared it
would kill the bill,” and quoting Melissa Sklarz, New York’s first transgendered person
to hold office, as being told by ESPA in 2000 that “it was ‘a lesbian and gay organiza-
tion’ and not a lobby for people like her.”).
50 Bob Bacigalupi, Transgender Rights in Focus, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 2001, at S6.
51 Id.
52 Introduction to TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 3, at 8.
53 Id. at 1-2.
54 Id. at 8.
55 See, e.g., Bacigalupi, supra note 50 (“However understandable and utilitarian this
position [of excluding transgendered people from civil rights measures] may be, it
simply does not comport with the principle of equality for all.”). See also supra note 49
regarding the passage of SONDA.
56 Chai R. Feldblum, Gay People, Trans People, Women: Is It All About Gender?, 17
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623, 674 (2000).
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C. Theories on the Cause of Transgender Discrimination
One commentator, Terry S. Kogan, addresses transgender dis-
crimination by exploring two alternative ways to conceptualize sex
and gender. One approach is to view sex and gender as a “sexual
continuism,” an idea he credits to Martine Rothblatt.57 According
to Kogan, Rothblatt’s “apartheid of sex” argument posits that al-
though society arbitrarily divides people exclusively into male and
female, sex should be viewed on a continuum with no exclusive
male and female categories and without regard to genitalia.58 Ko-
gan says that Rothblatt believes people should choose where to
place themselves on the continuum of sex.59 In this regard, Roth-
blatt embraces transgenderism because “even if a sex type was real
at birth, it can now be changed at will during one’s life.”60 If Roth-
blatt’s theory were adopted, perhaps laws could then be reinter-
preted to accommodate this continuum.
The other way to view sex and gender, according to Kogan, is
to place members of sex/gender minorities into a third sex/gen-
der category.61 Kogan offers his own theory of the “other” as a
third sex or gender, an idea found in many cultures.62 He says that
identifying oneself as “other” “is a conscious choice by an individ-
ual to oppose the male/female, masculine/feminine dichotomies,
and the oppressions that result from those dichotomies.”63 Accord-
ing to Kogan, implementing the “other” category as a choice in
society is a better solution than Rothblatt’s gender continuum be-
cause it is “highly respectful of an individual’s choice of self-defini-
tion,” and might encourage all kinds of people to transgress
societal norms.64 As a first step toward implementing this idea, Ko-
gan suggests making an “other” choice in public restrooms. If im-
plemented, “[a]n individual’s decision to use that restroom for the
first time [would be] an important step toward dismantling our cul-
ture’s rigid gender codes.”65
Rothblatt’s gender continuum theory makes for difficult law-
making, as lawmaking is generally geared toward categorical expla-
57 Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a Restroom
Labeled “Other,” 48 Hastings L.J. 1223, 1235 (1996-1997).
58 Id. at 1238.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1240 (quoting MARTINE ROTHBLATT, THE APARTHEID OF SEX: A MANIFESTO
ON THE FREEDOM OF GENDER 16 (1995)).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1245.
63 Id. at 1247.
64 Id. at 1254.
65 Id.
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nations and classifications. Furthermore, the negative reaction by
so many courts to transgendered plaintiffs who defy established sex
categories makes it unlikely they would easily accept sex as a fluid
choice. Kogan’s “other” solution, on the other hand, might be ex-
tremely difficult to implement in a society that is afraid of the con-
cept of transgenderism. The amorphous, dehumanized association
of the term “other” might serve to increase discrimination and hos-
tility toward transgendered individuals. Furthermore, many trans-
gendered people sincerely wish to live as their “adoptive” sex.
Given their dedication to propagating gender codes and fulfilling
gender stereotypes, transgendered individuals would probably not
distance themselves from the male or female gender by identifying
themselves as “other.”
III. OVERVIEW OF DISCRIMINATION CASE LAW ON THE
FEDERAL LEVEL
Currently, there is no national policy in place in the United
States to protect transgendered people from discrimination.66
However, the lack of established policy has not thwarted attempts
by transgendered individuals to file lawsuits. Transgendered peo-
ple have filed discrimination suits under Title VII for sex discrimi-
nation, transgender discrimination, and sexual harassment. They
also have tried to sue under Title IX of the Education Act on the
grounds of sexual harassment, and under the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act based on disability.67 They also have made strides to
implement the Employment Non-Discrimination Act as a basis for
future lawsuits. For the most part, these suits have not prevailed. In
fact, arguably the most helpful case on record for the transgender
66 However, there has been a call for international legislation addressing the rights
of transgendered people. See Int’l Conference on Transgender Law & Employment
Policy, The International Bill of Gender Rights (June 17, 1995), at http://www.altsex.org/
transgender/ibgr.html (on file with the New York City Law Review). This bill of rights
calls for the acceptance of ten universal rights, including rights to define gender iden-
tity; to freely express gender identity; to secure and retain employment and receive
just compensation; to gain access to gendered space and participation in gendered
activity; to control and change one’s own body; to have competent medical and pro-
fessional care; to be free from psychiatric diagnosis or treatment; to sexual expres-
sion; to form committed, loving relationships and enter into marital contracts; and to
conceive, bear, or adopt children as well as to nurture and have custody of children
and to exercise parental capacity.  Accordingly, when those rights are embraced by all
of humankind, “the acts of legislatures and pronouncements of courts and other gov-
erning structures will necessarily follow.” Id.
67 While transgendered people also have made equal protection claims, these have
failed because courts consistently have found that transgendered people do not com-
prise a suspect class. See Greenberg supra 4, at 319 n.436.
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movement is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which involved a nontrans-
gendered plaintiff.68
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196469 is a remedial statute
that is meant to protect individuals from employment discrimina-
tion. Originally written as a shield against private racial discrimina-
tion in the workplace,70 it was expanded to protect employees from
discrimination on the basis of sex.71 The Act clearly states that em-
ployers are barred from discriminating against employees on the
bases of “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.”72 “Sex” is not defined in the statute, nor is it
explained in the legislative history. Despite this lack of clarity,
courts have decided that the Act does not prohibit gender identity
discrimination.73 To date, every federal court that has considered
the issue has refused to extend Title VII protection to trans-
gendered people claiming discrimination.74
68 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
69 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (2004).
70 See David E. Rovella, Same-Sex Harassment Suits on Rise, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL,
Feb. 10, 1997, at A1 (“Originally constructed as a shield against private discrimina-
tion, Title VII was aimed primarily at redressing racial discrimination in the
workplace.”).
71 H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (“The
purpose of this title is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal
remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or
national origin.”). Supposedly the prohibition against sex discrimination was added
to Title VII on the floor of the House of Representatives as a ploy by Representative
Howard W. Smith (D. Va.) to encourage other (sexist) representatives to defeat the
bill. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Green); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN
& LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (5th ed. 2003);
CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115-17 (1985); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 63 (1986); Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker
of Public Policy, 9 Law & Inequality 163, 163 (1991).
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
73 See discussion infra in this Part.
74 See Kristine W. Holt, Comment, Reevaluating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection,
and the Evolution of a Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 Temple L. Rev. 283, 301 (1997)
(“When a non-transgendered individual suffers from an adverse employment decision
predicated upon stereotypical characteristics and behaviors that may or may not be
complementary to her anatomical sex, that individual has a cause of action under
Title VII.”).   However, when a transgendered employee suffers in the same manner,
that individual has no cause of action. See id. at 285.
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1. Discrimination Suits Under Title VII Based on Sex
The Ninth Circuit Court was one of the first courts to seriously
address the issue of sex and gender as it relates to transgendered
people in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.75 Holloway was a trans-
gendered person who was fired from Arthur Andersen after transi-
tioning from male to female.  She sued under Title VII for sex
discrimination.76 Despite Holloway’s claim that sex was synony-
mous with gender, the court determined that the “traditional
meaning” of sex was anatomical and based solely on biology.77 The
court cited legislative intent and the fact that Congress had not
amended the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination against
homosexuals to bolster its interpretation of Congress’s intent to
have only a narrow meaning for the term “sex” which relates solely
to biology.78 By interpreting “sex” strictly, the court set a precedent
for future cases and effectively established a significant hurdle for
transgendered plaintiffs to overcome. The dissent in Holloway
stated that the effect of the case was that “the right to claim dis-
crimination [is limited] to those who were born into the victim
class.”79
The Supreme Court declined to adjudicate Ulane v. Eastern Air-
lines, the next significant case in the line of transgender jurispru-
dence, which involved a male airline pilot who was fired after
becoming a woman.80 The pilot sued, citing Title VII’s prohibition
of discrimination based on sex.81 The Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court, which had held that Ulane had been discriminated
against as a transgendered person, and it concluded that the term
“sex” was not synonymous with sexual identification.82 The court
relied on its interpretation of congressional intent to define sex as
biological.83 It found that if Ulane had been discriminated against
because she was now a woman, Title VII would have protected her,
but it did not protect her change of sex.84
Thus, the court made clear, in its invocation of Ulane’s past,
that although a transsexual could state a valid Title VII cause of
75 Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
76 Id. at 661.
77 Id. at 662.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
80 Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.  denied, 471 U.S.
1017 (1985).
81 Id. at 1082.
82 Id. at 1087.
83 Id. at 1086.
84 Id. at 1087.
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action on the basis of his or her reassigned sex, the discrimina-
tion could always be reframed as discrimination on the basis of
transsexuality, which . . . under Title VII is no claim at all.85
The court concluded that the plaintiff was discriminated against
for something she did, not for what she was, and that such discrimi-
nation was legally permissible.
Other federal cases that have followed this line of thinking in-
clude Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.,86 and James v. Ranch Mart
Hardware, Inc.87 In Sommers, which involved a fired male-to-female
transgendered person, the court decided that under Title VII, the
plaintiff was male because she was anatomically male.88 James in-
volved a plaintiff who was hired as a man and fired after she in-
formed her employer of her decision to live as a woman.89 The
James court quoted Sommers, saying, “Even if plaintiff is psychologi-
cally female, Congress did not intend ‘to ignore anatomical classifi-
cation and determine a person’s sex according to the psychological
makeup of that individual.’”90
The Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins case in 1989 seemed to herald a
change in courts’ tendencies to strictly interpret “sex” as anatomi-
cal and place sex into the realm of expression or behavior.91 The
nontransgendered plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, was denied a promotion
to partnership at her accounting firm and she sued for sex discrim-
ination, claiming her Title VII rights had been violated.92 Despite
the quality of her work, the partners in the firm who denied her
promotion reportedly described Hopkins as “macho,” stated that
she “overcompensated for being a woman,” and one partner even
suggested that she “wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry,” to improve her chances of making partner.93 Hopkins was
criticized and discriminated against at work for failing to conform
to female stereotypes.
The Supreme Court recognized that Hopkins had been dis-
criminated against for not being stereotypically female and said in
its opinion, “[w]e take these words [of Title VII] to mean that gen-
der must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”94 The Court’s
85 Storrow, supra note 18, at 321.
86 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
87 No. 94-2235-KHV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19102 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 1994).
88 667 F.2d at 749.
89 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19102, at *1-2.
90 Id. at *3 (quoting Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749).
91 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
92 Id. at 231-32.
93 Id. at 235.
94 Id. at 240.
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conclusion took a broader view of the Title VII phrase “because of
sex” than previous cases in other courts. But as one theorist points
out “there is still a distance between acknowledging that an em-
ployer violates Title VII when he refuses to promote a woman be-
cause she is not feminine enough, and recognizing that an
employer similarly violates Title VII when he refuses to promote a
woman because she looks like a man.”95
Based on the language regarding gender in Price Waterhouse, it
seemed likely that a transgender case could be argued along simi-
lar lines.96 Fourteen years later, the truck driver plaintiff in Oiler v.
Winn Dixie,97 who cross-dressed outside of work, was fired “because of
his lifestyle.”98 Using a Price Waterhouse argument, the plaintiff,
Oiler, alleged that he was fired because he “did not conform to a
gender stereotype.”99 In analyzing Oiler’s argument, the court ob-
served that under the Supreme Court’s theory in Price Waterhouse,
relief would be available under Title VII for discrimination based
upon sexual stereotypes.100 Despite this promising language, how-
ever, the court in Winn Dixie did not find that the plaintiff was dis-
criminated against for not acting masculine enough, but for
“disguising himself as a woman” and therefore Title VII did not
apply.101 The court acknowledged that the defendant company’s
actions might be “morally wrong” but it refused to take a stand on
the issue.102 Rather, the court entrusted Congress to “expand the
definition of sex as used in Title VII beyond its common and tradi-
tional interpretation.”103
The Ninth Circuit signaled a change in gender jurisprudence
in 2000 in Schwenk v. Hartford, which involved a transgendered pris-
oner who was sexually harassed and assaulted by a prison guard.104
There, the court held that the Holloway judicial approach had been
“overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse,” and
found that discrimination for not acting like a stereotypical man or
95 Feldblum, supra note 56, at 643.
96 Id. at 675 (“In the wake of Price Waterhouse, courts should be more receptive to
arguments that other instances of discrimination based on employees’ failure to adapt
to certain sex stereotypes violate Title VII and analogous state laws.”).
97 Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc, No. 00-3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417
(E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).
98 Id. at *9.
99 Id. at *24.
100 Id. at *26 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989)).
101 Id. at *28.
102 Id. at *30.
103 Id. at *31.
104 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
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woman was forbidden under Title VII.105 Also in 2000, in Rosa v.
Park West Bank & Trust Co., the First Circuit Court reinstated the
claim of a biological male who identified as female and was denied
the opportunity to apply for a bank loan because of how she
dressed.106
Some theorists have argued that gender identity is too fluid
for Title VII jurisprudence. “Title VII’s sex discrimination jurispru-
dence must be reconceptualized to account for the reality of indi-
viduals who are both male and female, whether at the same
moment in time or at different moments over time.”107 For trans-
gender plaintiffs to succeed with sexual discrimination cases, the
entire notion of sexual discrimination should be viewed as gender
discrimination.
Another criticism of courts’ approaches to transgender dis-
crimination cases is that they interpret “sex” versus “gender” based
on Congressional intent. It is entirely likely that Congress did not
consider “sex” to include transgendered people at the time it
drafted Title VII, but, as the commentator Julie Greenberg points
out, that “does not lead to the conclusion that the wrongs Congress
sought to remedy when it adopted Title VII do not affect these
individuals.”108
In analyzing Ulane (the case involving the airline pilot who was
fired), some commentators have compared transgendered people
to other protected classes. For example, commentator Greenberg
argues that, just as employees who change religions are protected
from discrimination based on their “new” religion, courts should
similarly treat transgendered people who change to a new sex.109
“Regardless of whether transsexuals are being discriminated
against based upon their transsexual status or their change from
one sex to another, they should receive Title VII protection just as
the religious convert would receive Title VII protection.”110
2. Discrimination Suits under Title VII Based on Being
Transgendered
Transgendered plaintiffs have brought Title VII cases claiming
that they were discriminated against for being transgendered and
105 Id. at 1202. Note that the language of the Gender Motivated Violence Act,
under which the plaintiff brought suit, mirrors the language of Title VII.
106 Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
107 Cain, supra note 2, at 1359.
108 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 324.
109 Id. at 321 n.445.
110 Id.
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not because of their sex per se. The plaintiff in Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc. was successful in using this argument, but the Su-
preme Court summarily reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision in
her favor because “Title VII does not protect transsexuals.”111 In
reaction, commentator Patricia Cain argues that adopting a liberal
interpretation of anti-discrimination law means that courts must
hold that Title VII was created to protect everyone, regardless of
sex.112 Under this theory, Title VII would protect a transgendered
person in situations where the person can prove that discrimina-
tion occurred because of perceptions about her or his gender ap-
pearance, as well as in situations where “the employer claims that
discrimination occurred because the employee failed to fit within
the neat binary classifications of male or female.”113
An alternate theory addressing transgender discrimination
proposes that the law should only recognize the self-defined gen-
der of post-operative transsexuals.114 However, this solution fails to
take into consideration that post-operative transsexuals comprise a
small percentage of the transgender community. Under this theory
the majority of transgendered persons would be precluded from
Title VII protection.  The high cost of surgery makes it prohibitive
to many, most medical coverage does not include sex-reassignment
surgery, and not all individuals who identify with the opposite gen-
der elect to make the physical transition. Moreover, such a clear-
cut classification would essentially place those transsexuals making
the transition to the opposite gender (which lasts for at least one
year and often longer) in legal and social limbo. This theory also
limits the expansion of the traditional categories to those individu-
als who have aligned their gender identification with their physical
sexuality.
3. Discrimination Suits Under Title VII (and Title IX)
Based on Sexual Harassment
No federal court, except the district court in Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, which was later reversed, has found that discrimination
based on a plaintiff’s status as a transgendered person is discrimi-
111 Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 U.S. 1081, 1084 (1984).
112 Cain, supra note 2, at 1356.
113 Id. at 1356.
114 See Jody Lynee´ Madeira, Law as a Reflection of Her/His-Story: Current Institutional
Perceptions of, and Possibilities for, Protecting Transsexuals’ Interests in Legal Determinations
of Sex, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 128, 177 (2002) (stating, “only those transsexuals whose
gender was harmonized with anatomical sex and secondary sex characteristics would
be legally recognized as members of their self-identified sex.”).
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nation based on sex under Title VII.115 However, the Supreme
Court has held that same-sex discrimination is actionable under
Title VII, which might pave the way for future transgender victo-
ries. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., a heterosexual
man who worked on an oil platform was humiliated and sexually
assaulted by other male heterosexual crewmembers.116 The Su-
preme Court held that same-sex discrimination is prohibited under
Title VII, so long as the victim can prove that harassment resulted
because of a person’s sex.117 In deciding that same-sex sexual har-
assment is actionable under Title VII, the unanimous Court said,
male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly
not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it en-
acted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ulti-
mately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal con-
cerns of our legislators by which we are governed.118
One could argue that this unanimous decision removed the
“legislative intent” argument regarding Title VII and broadened
the interpretation of “sex” considerably, if judges are allowed to
interpret Title VII as going “beyond” what it was enacted for and if
the “provisions of our laws” are deemed more controlling than leg-
islators’ concerns.  Under this guise, it is not difficult to argue that
transgender discrimination is covered by Title VII as a “reasonably
comparable evil” to race and sex discrimination. Using Price
Waterhouse and Oncale as examples, the theorist Chai Feldblum has
noted that courts are beginning to realize that adverse action taken
against an individual because that individual does not conform to
societal expectations of how a “real man” or “real woman” should
look or act are actions taken “because of sex.”119 She notes that
such an interpretation of the phrase is no longer precluded simply
because Congress had not contemplated such a result when it en-
acted Title VII in 1964.120
In another case, sexual harassment of a transgendered woman
was determined to be illegal under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, although the decision has some caveats.
Miles v. New York University involved a male professor who sexually
115 Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
116 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998).
117 Id. at 79.
118 Id.
119 Feldblum, supra note 56, at 642-45.
120 Id.
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harassed a female transgendered student.121 The district court
found that Title IX prohibited sexual harassment of a transsexual
woman.122 However, the professor accused of harassing the student
did not know she was transgendered, diminishing the victory some-
what. While the student’s sex as a female was legitimized by not
being considered an issue by the court, the court came to its con-
clusion without addressing her gender identity, so it is difficult to
argue that the case constituted progress in the battle for trans-
gender equality.
B. Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
Federal claims of discrimination based on transgenderism as a
disability are rarely contemplated because of the clear language of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1997.123 Although the
American Psychiatric Association classifies gender dysphoria as a
gender identity disorder,124 the ADA does not include it as a disor-
der, in fact it specifically excludes transgendered people from the
protective class.125 The Act says that the term “‘disability’ shall not
include—(1) transvestism, transsexualism . . . gender identity disor-
ders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual be-
havior disorders . . . .”
C. Employment Non-Discrimination Act
Because attempts to gain transgender equality in the federal
court system have been unsuccessful, some believe that the con-
gressionally proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) may be an effective means to gain transgender equality on
the national level, and would serve as a compelling basis for filing
lawsuits.126 The bill calls for amending Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to prohibit workplace discrimination based on sexual
orientation.127 It was first introduced in 1994 and reintroduced in
1996, when it was passed in the House of Representatives, but
failed in the Senate by one vote.128 In 2001 the bill was re-intro-
121 Miles v. New York Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
122 Id. at 249-50.
123 42 U.S.C.S. § 12211(b) (2002).
124 DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, supra note 6.
125 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 12211(b).
126 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2001, H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. (2001);
Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996); Employ-
ment Non-Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995); Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong (1994).
127 H.R. 2692.
128 S. 2056.
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duced, but no vote was taken.129
In the ENDA, “sexual orientation” is defined as “homosexual-
ity, bisexuality, or heterosexuality, whether the orientation is real
or perceived.”130 Individuals are protected based on their sexual
orientation, thus membership in the protected class under the
ENDA is unrelated to a person’s gender identity or gender expres-
sion. The only way a transgendered person is protected under the
bill is if an employer discriminates against a person whose gender
expression is or is perceived to be gay or bisexual. Therefore, if a
transgendered person is discriminated against because she or he is
transgendered, such discrimination could not be challenged under
the ENDA. This is why some transgendered people advocate
amending the ENDA to include transgendered people as a pro-
tected class.131
Another way to gain equal rights for transgendered people on
a national scale would be to amend Title VII to specifically include
gender, particularly in view of the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of “sex” in Price Waterhouse. This could be done by amending the
Civil Rights Act to include transgendered people in the definition
of “sex,” which would effectively preserve the small strides made by
the transgender movement on the national level.
IV. OVERVIEW OF DISCRIMINATION CASE LAW ON THE STATE
LEVEL AND INTERPRETING STATE LAW
State courts often rely on federal court interpretations of Title
VII and the ADA to evaluate claims derived from analogous state
and local legislation. In recent years, however, some state courts,
notably those in New York and New Jersey, have interpreted cases
more favorably for transgendered individuals than have the federal
courts. Furthermore, some federal courts have interpreted state an-
tidiscrimination laws more favorably than federal laws.
A. Sex Discrimination Suits
Transgendered people have filed lawsuits in state courts across
the country based on sex discrimination to little avail. For example,
Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission involved a transgendered
person who was hired as a woman, but who was fired when her
129 H.R. 2692.
130 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1999, H.R., 2355, 106th Cong. § 3(9)
(1999).
131 See, e.g., John M. Ohle, Constructing the Trannie: Transgender People and the Law, 8
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 237, n.22 (2004).
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employer discovered she was transitioning from male to female.132
The Supreme Court of Iowa conclusively held that the Iowa Civil
Rights Act did not intend to protect transsexuals.133 In 1997, the
Superior Court of Connecticut in Conway v. City of Hartford relied
on federal authority and Connecticut legislative intent to dismiss a
transgendered person’s sex discrimination claim based on the
Connecticut Fair Employment Practice Act.134
Another case, Underwood v. Archer Management Services, Inc., in-
volved a transgendered employee who sued her former employer
on several grounds, including based on the local human rights
law.135 The district court there granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the plaintiff’s sex discrimination and sexual orientation dis-
crimination claims, holding that the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act did not apply.136 However, the court found that the
plaintiff’s claim of discrimination because of “personal appear-
ance,” which is specifically prohibited in the D.C. statute, was
valid.137 The language of D.C.’s human rights law is unique, thus,
the decision provides little precedent for transgender discrimina-
tion law.
However, some state courts, with New York in the forefront,
have begun moving away from the restrictive federal interpretation
of “sex” and have held that the definition intended by Congress
does not necessarily apply to state anti-discrimination laws.138 In
Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry Inc., which involved a harassment suit by
a female-to-male transgendered person in 1995, the court took a
broad and inclusive approach.139 Using common sense to differen-
tiate between sexual orientation and sexual identity, the trial court
based its decision on the language of New York City’s Human
Rights Law, which prohibits discrimination based on gender.140
The judge wrote: “an employee who has fulfilled a sexual identity
132 Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n., 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983). Sommers is
the same plaintiff who sued in federal court in Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667
F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982), discussed supra.
133 Id. at 477.
134 Conway v. City of Hartford, No. CV95 0553003, 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 282
(1997).
135 857 F. Supp. 96 (D. D.C. 1994).
136 Id. at 98.
137 Id. at 98-99.
138 See, e.g., Maffei v. Kolaeton, 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (“our
Court of Appeals has noted that even though the State statute is similar, New York
courts are not bound by interpretations of the Federal law (even by the United States
Supreme Court), although the determinations are ‘instructive’ . . . ”).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 396.
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urge by changing sex and is harassed because of such fulfillment is
entitled to the law’s protection against employer harassment.”141
Rentos v. Oce-Office Systems followed in New York federal court in
1996. Rentos concerned a sex discrimination suit filed by a post-
operative transgendered person against her former employer
based on local human rights laws.142 The district court held that
the plaintiff had established membership in a protected class
under New York City and New York State human rights laws.143 Al-
though the decision was a clear victory for transgendered people in
New York, the case left some questions unanswered, including
whether the case law applied to non-post-operative transsexuals.
In Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems, the New Jersey plaintiff
used the Price Waterhouse theory to advance the gender versus sex
idea even further.144 In that case, a physician who began transition-
ing from male to female was terminated without cause from her
place of employment, an outpatient treatment facility.145 After dis-
cussing gender dysphoria, the condition with which the plaintiff
had been diagnosed, the court turned its attention to Title VII.146
Referring to Price Waterhouse, the court said the case indicated that
the term “sex” in Title VII encompassed both gender and sex and
“forbids discrimination because of one’s failure to act in a way ex-
pected of a man or a woman.”147
The plaintiff in Enriquez also argued that New Jersey law pre-
cluded discrimination against employees on the basis of sexual
identity or gender.148 In analyzing this argument, the Enriquez
court cited Zalewski v. Overlook Hospital, where the New Jersey Supe-
rior Court applied New Jersey’s anti-discrimination law to a situa-
tion involving a heterosexual man who was sexually harassed by his
heterosexual male coworkers who thought he was a virgin.149 The
judge in the Zalewski case said, “[we should not] condone severe
sexual harassment of a person because he is perceived or pre-
141 Id.
142 Rentos v. Oce-Office Systems, No. 95-7908, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19060 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 24, 1996).
143 Id. at *26 (“Any ambiguity as to the plaintiff’s protected status is therefore
merely reflective of the present state of the law, and the complaint clearly alleges
membership in what at least one court has found to be a protected class under city
and state law.”).
144 Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 342 N.J. Super. 501 (2001).
145 Id. at 506.
146 Id. at 509-12.
147 Id. at 512 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000).
148 Id. at 511-12.
149 Id. at 515 (citing Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 300 N.J. Super. 202 (Super Ct. Law
Div. 1996)).
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sumed to be less than someone’s definition of masculine.”150 This
language was easily applied to the transgender situation in Enriquez
where, in a sympathetic and liberally construed opinion, the court
decided to follow the similar reasoning of Maffei and Price
Waterhouse:
A person who is discriminated against because he changes his
gender from male to female is being discriminated against be-
cause he or she is a member of a very small minority whose con-
dition remains incomprehensible to most individuals. The view
of sex discrimination reflected in these decisions [Sommers v.
Iowa Civil Rights Commission; James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc.;
and Underwood v. Archer Management Services, Inc.] is too
constricted.151
Other states have taken different measures. For example, the
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities de-
clared in 2000 that discrimination against an individual based on
transgender status constitutes discrimination based on sex under
Connecticut law.152 The Commission stated that “more and more
courts have ruled that having specific expectations that a person
will manifest certain behavior based upon his or her gender is not
only conceptually outmoded sexual stereotyping, but also an un-
lawful form of sex discrimination.”153
B. State Discrimination Suits Based on Disability
In determining whether gender dysphoria is protected under
state disability laws, many state courts follow the example of the
federal courts and specifically exclude gender dysphoria from their
lists of protected disabilities.154 In states that do not specifically cite
gender dysphoria as a nonprotected disorder, state courts have
nonetheless held that transgendered people are not protected
under state laws.155 Until recently, the closest a court had come to
150 Zalewski, 300 N.J. Super. at 211.
151 Enriquez, 342 N.J. Super. at 513.
152 Conn. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, Declaratory Ruling on Behalf
of John/Jane Doe (Nov. 9, 2000) (on file with the New York City Law Review).
153 Id.
154 See Shannon Minter, Representing Transsexual Clients: Selected Legal Issues, available
at www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/translaw.htm (last modified Oct. 2003) (listing
states that specifically exempt transsexualism as a disability in state laws as including:
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia).
155 See Holt v. Northwest Pa. Training P’ship. Consortium, Inc., 694 A.2d 1134 (Pa.
Commw. 1997) (holding that transsexualism was not a disability); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. (“AMTRAK”), 850 F. Supp. 284, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that the
transgendered plaintiff was not impaired because she did not have any organic disor-
ders and was not restricted from any life activities); Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights
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protecting transgendered people under the legal theory of disabil-
ity was when in 1993, the Supreme Court of Washington held in
Doe v. Boeing that gender dysphoria was an “abnormal condi-
tion.”156 But the court held that the plaintiff was not “handi-
capped” because the defendant employer did not fire the plaintiff
employee “because of that condition.”157 Therefore, the court rea-
soned the plaintiff was not discriminated against.
In New Jersey, however, the concept of transgenderism as a
disability changed in 2001. In Enriqez v. West Jersey Health Systems,158
the transgendered plaintiff had also argued that gender dysphoria
was a handicap under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(LAD).159 The court agreed.160 Citing medical documentation that
showed gender dysphoria was a recognized medical disorder, the
court relied on precedent interpreting the LAD to apply to condi-
tions such as alcoholism and substance abuse.161 The court said,
“[t]he LAD has thus been broadly and liberally construed to in-
clude what otherwise might be termed emotional or mental disor-
ders, in order to eradicate the evil of discrimination in New
Jersey.”162 This case was deemed a victory for the plaintiff (al-
though the case was remanded for trial on whether she actually
had gender dysphoria) and other transgendered people in New
Jersey.
The New Jersey court in Enriquez spent a considerable amount
of time detailing how gender dysphoria is a medical disorder and
cited numerous references.163 In 2002, a Massachusetts Superior
Court followed this approach in Lie v. Sky Publishing Corp., holding
that a transgendered plaintiff had established a prima facie case of
discrimination on the basis of handicap under state law.164 This
Comm’n., 337 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa 1983) (holding that sex discrimination did not
apply to transgendered people under Iowa law and noting that “no claim is made that
a transsexual has an abnormal or unhealthy body”); Conway v. City of Hartford, No. 95-
0553003, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 282 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1997) (citing Dobre
and Sommers and holding that the plaintiff’s condition was not a physical disability or
mental disorder under Connecticut law), aff’d, 760 A.2d 974 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
156 846 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1993).
157 Id. at 538.
158 Discussed infra.
159 342 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (2001).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 519.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 510.
164 Lie v. Sky Publishing Corp., No. 01-3117, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 402 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2002). The court also found the plaintiff had made a successful sex
discrimination argument, but had no basis for a claim based on sexual orientation.
Id. at 4, 6.
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grounding in medical references is in keeping with Storrow’s the-
ory that courts are more inclined to be sympathetic to trans-
gendered people when doing so will promote congruence between
a person’s psychological and physical sexes.165 Although it may be
the most effective approach, the disability tactic of battling discrim-
ination may be the least attractive to transgendered people because
it equates their “condition” with physical and mental disorders.
V. LEGISLATION THAT PROTECTS TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE
Transgender activists have achieved greater success on the leg-
islative front than with the judiciary. In 1993 Minnesota became
the first state to enact an anti-discrimination law that expressly pro-
tects transgendered people in education, employment, housing
and public accommodations.166 Since then, Rhode Island, New
Mexico, and California have joined Minnesota’s ranks.167
Additional success has been achieved at the local level, in the
form of city and county ordinances that either explicitly prohibit
discrimination against transgendered people, or are construed to
protect gender variant individuals. Ordinances that protect trans-
gendered people have been passed around the country in a range
of localities, from large cities such as Los Angeles to small towns
like Huntington Woods, Wisconsin.168
In 1975, Minneapolis, Minnesota, was the first city to pass a
human rights law that included transgendered people.169 Fifteen
years later, only six other jurisdictions had adopted ordinances to
similar effect.170 But after nearly thirty years, the number of cities
and states that have enacted trans-protective ordinances now
stands at seventy-four and appears to be growing.171
165 Storrow, supra note 18.
166 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363 (West Supp. 2002).
167 See U.S. Jurisdictions with Laws Prohibiting Discrimination, supra note 45.
168 See, e.g., Transgender Law & Policy Inst., Populations of Jurisdictions with Trans-
gender Civil Rights Laws (Mar. 2004), at www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/transinclu-
sivelaws.pdf (on file with the New York City Law Review) (showing ordinances passed
in Los Angeles, with a population of 3,694,820 and Huntington Woods, MI, with a
population of 6,151) [hereinafter Populations of Jurisdictions].
169 Minneapolis, Minn., Code tit. 7, chs. 139, 141 (1975) (defining “affectional pref-
erence” as “having or projecting a self-image not associated with one’s biological
maleness or one’s biological femaleness”).
170 Transgender Law Policy Institute, Scope of Explicitly Transgender-Inclusive Anti-Dis-
crimination Laws (Mar. 2004), available at www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/
ngltftlpichart.pdf (listing the following jurisdictions as having transgender-protective
laws as of 1990: Los Angeles, Calif., Champaign, Ill., Urbana, Ill., Minneapolis, Minn.,
St. Paul, Minn., Harrisburg, Penn., and Seattle, Wash.).
171 Id.
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Activists point out that when enacting such statutes, phrasing
is critical to helping transgendered people overcome discrimina-
tion. “[T]he more clarity there is in the text of the statute itself–the
plain meaning of the law–the less trouble there will be when the
law gets interpreted later, by employers, by the local human rights
commission, and, eventually, by the courts.”172 Transgender advo-
cates have primarily focused on three ways of obtaining protection
through the legislative process: (1) by adding gender identity as a
protected status to a list of already existing categories; (2) by incor-
porating transgendered people into the definition of sexual orien-
tation already in a statute; or (3) by defining sexual orientation as
including perception of gender identity.173
Using the first approach, advocates have been successful in
gaining protection by adding categories which generally are de-
fined in the ordinances, including “gender identity,” “transgender”
and “transsexual.”174 For example, San Francisco’s employment,
housing, and public accommodations non-discrimination ordi-
nances were amended in 1994 to add transgender and gender-vari-
ant people to the list of protected classes under the term “gender
identity,” which the ordinance says, “shall mean a person’s various
individual attributes as they are understood to be masculine and/
or feminine.”175 Rhode Island’s nondiscrimination statute added
“gender identity or expression” as a protected category, which it
then broadly defined as “a person’s actual or perceived gender, as
172 TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 27, at 40. Proper enforcement also is impor-
tant. When San Francisco added “gender identity” as a protected class to its nondis-
crimination ordinances, the Human Rights Commission of the City and County of
San Francisco developed compliance guidelines to help implement its laws and to
“[c]reate a flexible implementation plan designed to provide guidance to agencies,
business establishments, and organizations seeking to comply with the law.” SAN FRAN-
CISCO HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES TO PROHIBIT GENDER IDENTITY
DISCRIMINATION (2003), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/sfhumanrights_page.
asp?id=6274. The guidelines provide definitions and suggestions for appropriate con-
duct and demeanor that agencies, business establishments and organizations should
adopt when engaged with transgendered individuals and they also detail the Commis-
sion’s expectations for the treatment of transgendered individuals. Id. In general, the
guidelines require that organizations comply with the ordinances by making a “rea-
sonable” effort to treat transgendered people the same as nontransgendered men and
women. Id. The guidelines offer advice for a range of situations, from schools and
places of employment to shelters. Id. Significantly, the guidelines state that gender
identity is self-determined, even when a person is undergoing gender transition. Id.
By making this point, the potential victim is empowered to control the situation.
Overall, the San Francisco guidelines offer a comprehensive model for implementing
a transgender statute that may provide a useful template for other locales.
173 Id. at 45-50.
174 Id.
175 S.F., Cal., Ordinance 433-94 (Dec. 30, 1994).
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well as a person’s gender identity, gender-related self-image, gen-
der-related appearance, or gender-related expression.”176 The Dis-
trict of Columbia is unique because it protects people on the basis
of “personal appearance,” which has been interpreted by the
courts there to protect transgendered people.177 Most local, state
and federal non-discrimination statutes use the term “sex,” rather
than the term “gender,” and few of those include definitions of
sex.
The second approach is to subsume transgendered people
under the category of sexual orientation. This option, chosen in
Minnesota, links homophobia and transphobia, which can be simi-
lar, and serves to cover a wide range of gender-variant people.178
The statute defines sexual orientation, in part, as “having or being
perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associ-
ated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness.”179 The third
approach is to include prohibitions of discrimination against trans-
gendered people under definitions of gender or sex. This ap-
proach includes transgendered individuals under established sex-
discrimination language, and interprets transgender discrimina-
tion as gender discrimination.
Even with nondiscrimination ordinances that already use the
term “gender” instead of “sex” it is possible for courts to exclude
transgendered people from protection. Such laws equate gender
with sex and use a Title VII interpretation of “sex.” Therefore,
some argue that “gender identity” must be added to laws to protect
transgendered people from discrimination as a protected class. As
experience in New York City shows, amending the term “sex” to
include transgendered people may be easier or simpler than ad-
ding another category. Furthermore, adding transgendered people
as a new protected subgroup may weaken the argument that they
are already protected under existing law.
VI. NEW YORK CITY’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS A MODEL
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ORDINANCE
New York City’s Human Rights Law, which is Title Eight of the
Administrative Code of the City of New York, affords people pro-
tection from discrimination on a wide range of bases. The law pro-
176 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-3 (2004).
177  See Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96 (D. D.C. 1994) (dis-
cussing District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2512(a)(1)).
178 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(41a) (West Supp. 2002).
179 Id.
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hibits discrimination in employment, housing and public
accommodations based on race, color, creed, age, national origin,
alienage, gender, sexual orientation, disability, marital status, crim-
inal status, and status as a victim of domestic violence.180
New York City amended its human rights law in 2002 to clarify
its established prohibition of discrimination based on gender.181
The new subdivision states:
[t]he term “gender” shall include actual or perceived sex and
shall also include a person’s gender identity, self-image, appear-
ance, behavior, or expression, whether or not that gender iden-
tity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression is different
from that traditionally associated with the legal sex assigned to
that person at birth.182
This new law made New York City the largest city in the United
States to adopt anti-discrimination transgender legislation.183
A. Legislative History and Passage of the Amendment
A group of New York City Council members initiated New
York City’s Human Rights Law amendment upon the recommen-
dation of a legislative work group, convened by the New York Asso-
ciation for Gender Rights Advocacy (NYAGRA), the New York
TransGender Coalition, and the Empire State Pride Agenda to
study discrimination against gender-variant individuals in New York
City.184 The proposal to amend the law was first presented in June
of 2000.185 The City Council convened a General Welfare Commit-
tee hearing in May of 2001 to discuss the language of the bill and
the need for a change.186 More than 200 people attended and sev-
eral experts and prominent transgender activists testified at the
hearing.187 Dennis deLeon, former chair/commissioner of the
180 See generally NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8 (2002).
181 NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102 (2002).
182 Id.
183 See Populations of Jurisdictions, supra note 167.
184 See Press Release, National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, New York City Trans-
gender Anti-Discrimination Law Take Effect Today (Apr. 30, 2002), available at
www.commondreams.org/news2002/0430-12.htm; N.Y. Ass’n for Gender Rights Ad-
vocacy, NYC Council Passes Transgender Rights Bill (Apr. 24, 2002), available at
www.nyagra.tripod.com/NewsRelease020424.html.
185 New York City Council, Legislative Details for Int. 0754-2000 (2000), available at
http://www.nyccouncil.info/issues/bill_details.cfm?ID=int%200754-2000&TYPE=
TYPE=1&YEAR=2000&SPONSORS=YES&REPORTS=YES&HISTORY=YES.
186 Inga Sorenson, Transgender Activists State Case to Council, NEW YORK BLADE (May
11, 2001), available at http://www.ntac.org/news (listed under headlines for May 18,
2001).
187 Id.
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New York City Commission on Human Rights, appeared before the
General Welfare Committee.188 He said that during his tenure as
commissioner (from March 1990 to January 1994) he was aware of
pervasive discrimination against transgendered people in the areas
of employment, housing and public accommodations.189 He also
testified that landlords and employers who discriminated against
transgendered people argued that they were not violating the
Human Rights Law because the language in the statute was ambig-
uous.190 DeLeon testified that, “[t]he absence of specific reference
to gender identity or expression in the statute told these individu-
als that there was no bar in refusing to hire a transgendered person
because it “ ‘offended’ the culture of the company.”191 Not only
were employers and landlords unclear about the legislative intent
of the term “gender,” those with diverse gender identities also were
unaware of their rights.192 DeLeon stated that confusion embed-
ded in the term “gender” was part of the problem.193
During the same committee hearing, Pauline Park, a NYAGRA
founder and coordinator of the legislative work group, called for
legal redress for transgendered people who face discrimination.194
In testifying for the amendment, she said:
[l]egislation would send a clear signal to employers, to land-
lords, to providers of public accommodations, and to ordinary
citizens that transgendered and gender-variant people are enti-
tled to the full protection of the law. And finally, and equally
importantly, legislation would communicate to transgendered
people themselves that they have access to legal redress through
the Human Rights Commission and through private legal
action.195
At the same hearing, Dr. Paisley Currah, associate professor of
political science at Brooklyn College of the City University of New
York, testified that the bill represented a growing trend in law re-
garding gender-based discrimination, a trend that is responsive to
188 Transgender Law & Policy Institute, Testimony of Dennis deLeon on Intro. 754,






193 Id. (“It is the very ambiguity of the law that this legislation is intended to
address.”).
194 Transgender Law & Policy Inst., Int. No. 754 Public Hearing Testimony on Behalf of
NYAGRA by Pauline Park (May 4, 2001), available at http://www.transgenderlaw.org/
resources/park.htm.
195 Id.
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increasing numbers of transgendered people losing their jobs and
housing due to discrimination.196 Currah said, “[t]his discrimina-
tion is rooted in the same stereotypes that have fueled the unequal
treatment of women, lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, and people
with disabilities–that is, stereotypes about how men and women are
‘supposed’ to behave, and about how male and female bodies are
‘supposed’ to appear.”197
New York City’s then-existing statutory language and case law
on the subject was the cause of some of the confusion and discord
at the time of the bill’s introduction. Some city officials believed
that transgendered people were already covered under the city’s
anti-discrimination law because of the term “gender” instead of
“sex” was used in the ordinance.198 Some members of the Human
Rights Commission felt that transgendered people were covered
under a claim based on disability.199 However, as discussed earlier
in reference to the Americans with Disabilities Act,200 it is not clear
that a disability argument would be possible or appropriate for
every transgender discrimination claim.
One could argue that because the term “gender” was judicially
interpreted as including transgendered people in Maffei201 and
Rentos,202 which held that local laws protected transgendered peo-
ple under “sex discrimination,” there was no need to alter the cur-
rent law. However, because the facts of Maffei and Rentos involved
post-operative transgendered people, it was unclear whether the
decisions applied to other transgendered people.
Passage of the amendment failed, but the bill was proposed
again in January of 2002.203 Another hearing was held on April 23,
196 Transgender Law & Policy Inst., Statement by Dr. Paisley Currah, Associate Professor
of Political Science, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York before the General Wel-
fare Committee of the New York City Council concerning Int. No. 754 (May 4, 2001), available
at www.transgenderlaw.org.
197 Id.
198 Sorenson, supra note 185. At the committee hearing, Marta Varela, then-chair of
the New York City Commission on Human Rights, testified that the City Council’s
prior amendment of the law to change “sex” to “gender” “effectively expanded the
protections afforded by the law.” Id.
199 Id.
200 Discussed supra in Part III(A).
201 Maffei v. Kolaeton, 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
202 Rentos v. Oce-Office Systems, No. 95-7908, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19060  (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 24, 1996).
203 See New York City Council, Legislative Details for Int 0024-2002, Gender-Based Dis-
crimination (2002), available at http://www.nyccouncil.info/issues/search.cfm?ID=int
%200024-2002&KEYWORD=Gender&TYPE=1&YEAR=2002&HISTORY=YES (under
“Search Legislation” select “introductions” for Document Type, select “2002” for Year,
and type “gender” for Keyword).
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2002, by the General Welfare Committee, which approved the bill
that day.204 The City Council approved it the next day and New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed the new subdivision
into law on April 30, 2002.205 The legislative findings of the amend-
ment read:
[t]his local law is intended to make clear that all gender-based
discrimination–including, but not limited to, discrimination
based on an individual’s actual or perceived sex, and discrimina-
tion based on an individual’s gender identity, self-image, ap-
pearance, behavior, or expression–constitutes a violation of the
City’s Human Rights Law. . . . For those individuals, gender-
based discrimination often leads to pariah status including the
loss of a job, the loss of an apartment, and the refusal of service
in public accommodations such as restaurants or stores. . . . In
adopting this legislation, the City Council declares that the abil-
ity of all New Yorkers to work and to live free from invidious
discrimination based on gender is the guiding principle of pub-
lic policy and law.206
Currah commented on the impact of the law’s amendment by
saying, “the City Council is sending a very clear signal to employers,
to landlords and to owners of public accommodations that this
kind of discriminatory behavior is now illegal.”207 With the passage
of the amendment, New York City became the third jurisdiction in
New York State to pass anti-discrimination laws in favor of trans-
gendered people.208 Because of New York City’s large population
of over eight million people, the passage of the measure dramati-
cally increased the national percentage of people who live in areas
where there are transgender-inclusive anti-discrimination laws.209
New York City’s ordinance is particularly noteworthy because
“transgender” is not a separate and protected category. Rather, the
term “gender,” which was already in the statute, is more clearly de-
fined as including transgendered people. The language of many
other ordinances is broad and open to interpretation, but New
York’s ordinance is specific about gender identity being “actual or
perceived.” This language indicates that the law protects people
204 Id.
205 Id.
206  NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102 (2002) (accompanying note).
207 See Press Release, Transgender Law & Policy Institute, New York City Council
Votes to Include Transgender People in its Human Rights Law (April 24, 2002), avail-
able at www.transgender law.org/nycapril02.htm.
208 See id. (Rochester and Suffolk County are the other two jurisdictions that have
passed anti-discrimination laws in favor of transgendered people.)
209 See Populations of Jurisdictions, supra note 167.
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who are gender ambiguous, whereas other ordinances, like San
Francisco’s, which use the terms “masculine” and “feminine” might
be construed to mean a person must be one or the other.
As discussed earlier, some critics worry that making trans-
gendered people a separate class will lead society and courts to
think that they were not protected before and will, in some way,
reinforce the idea that transgendered people are “different.” Be-
cause New York’s amendment to its Human Rights Law “clarified”
the law, it suggested that transgendered people should have been
included under the existing sex discrimination law. The amend-
ment merely made this fact clear. Such an approach was possible
given the language already present in New York City’s Administra-
tive Code. One could argue that cases like Price Waterhouse and Maf-
fei have stretched the term “sex” to mean “gender” and by taking
this approach one step further, prohibition of discrimination
based on “gender” should naturally include transgendered people.
B. The Effects of the Amendment
Since its enactment, transgendered people have successfully
used the New York City amendment. A case decided in October of
2002, McGrath et alia, v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., addressed a question
about whether New York City’s Human Rights Law protected trans-
gendered people.210 In McGrath, three shoppers claimed that the
defendant store was responsible for the actions of its employees
who had violated sections of the New York City Administrative
Code by denying them accommodations, privileges or facilities of
the store because of their actual or perceived gender or sexual ori-
entation.211 In June of 2002, a jury returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiffs, but only awarded them nominal damages.212 The
plaintiffs appealed, seeking attorney’s fees.213 In analyzing the case,
the district court admitted there was a question about whether the
Administrative Code’s protections extended to transgendered peo-
ple at the time of the original trial, but stated conclusively that the
ambiguity was resolved when the definition of gender was
amended to include prohibition of discrimination based on “gen-
der identity or expression.”214 The case was the first public accom-
210 No. 01-3071, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22610 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2002), appealed on
other grounds, 356 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004).
211 Id. at *2.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at *7.
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modations case under the new Human Rights Law and the first
victory of its kind for the rights of transgendered people.
The victory in McGrath was diminished somewhat in 2003
when a federal district court found that an employee’s sex discrimi-
nation claims against her employer were warrantless and granted
the defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment.215 The
plaintiff, who was a lesbian who acknowledged she did “not con-
form to gender norms,”216 based her complaint on the grounds of
sex, gender, sex stereotypes, and sexual orientation under Title VII
and New York State and City Human Rights laws.217 However, the
court focused its analysis on Title VII, because “[c]onsideration of
actions under the [New York State Human Rights Law] and [New
York City Human Rights Law] generally parallels the standards and
analysis applicable to Title VII claims.”218 The court declined to
discuss the new amendment to the New York City Human Rights
Law.
VII. CONCLUSION
While enactment of local ordinances may provide protection
to transgendered people, state and federal suits may use the ex-
panded definition of gender from Price Waterhouse. This effort
could be coupled with the argument that the purpose of Title VII
has changed substantially since it was first written. Extending pro-
tection to transgendered people is the logical next step. Also, de-
fining “sex” in future bills and in judicial opinions as inclusive of
gender and gender identity will help erode the stubborn confusion
about sex and gender that still lingers.219 In the end,
“[t]ransgender rights are simply human rights, based on the recog-
nition that transgendered people are human beings deserving of
215 Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 246 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
216 Id. at 306.
217 Id. at 304.
218 Id. at 313 n.4.
219 Educating people about transgendered people is important too. This will help
to dismantle the fear that many people associate with/have of transgendered people.
Perhaps the problem is not with our jurisprudential vision, but with our
inability to visualize what it means to be transsexual or transgendered.
And if, as it appears, some of our most progressive political communi-
ties experience difficulty with the blending of genders and sexes, then
perhaps we need to do some additional consciousness-raising on the
situation of transsexuals.
Cain, supra note 2, at 1323. One recommendation is for transgendered people to be
more visible. “[U]ltimately, personal contact with a member of a stigmatized group is
the best mechanism for changing people’s hearts and minds about the group.” Feld-
blum, supra note 56, at 653.
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common respect and dignity, regardless of their appearance or
their choices about how to manage the transgender aspect of their
lives.”220 Analogizing the transgender movement to past and cur-
rent movements for minority, women’s, and gay and lesbian rights,
it is clear that protecting transgendered people must be included
in any legitimate pursuit of equal rights for all.
220 Introduction to TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 3, at 12.
